Before any of these questions can be addressed, however, it is first necessary to provide a brief historical and historiographical overview. Already in the first three months after Stalin's death the number of prisoners in the Soviet Gulag fell from around 2.5 million to 1.3 million, largely as a result of the amnesty of 27 March 1953 which reduced the tariffs for those convicted of non-political crimes. Following several further waves of releases, amnesties and revision or commutation of sentences, the vast majority of MVD camps and colonies had been emptied by 1960 and only 550,882 inmates remained. Most of the close to three million persons estimated to be living in banishment in remote parts of the Soviet Union in 1953 -whether former political prisoners who had reached the end of their sentences, members of forcibly resettled national or ethnic groups, or peasants from the western regions of the USSR deported as kulaks -also had the remaining restrictions on their freedom of movement lifted between 1954 and the early 1960s. 6 Millions of children orphaned by the terror and subsequently brought up in state-run institutions, and relatives of Gulag prisoners who had faced harsh forms of discrimination in the spheres of education, welfare, right to travel and employment, likewise benefitted from the post-Stalinist 'Thaw'.
Meanwhile, as a result of petitions from individual citizens or recommendations made by various sentencing review commissions, courts were instructed to re-examine large numbers of political cases, and between 1954 and 1961 up to 800,000 Soviet citizens, some dead, some living, and tens of thousands of foreigners, were formally rehabilitated in the sense of having their convictions overturned. 8 Khrushchev, while himself heavily implicated in some of the crimes committed under Stalin, nonetheless became a firm advocate not only of the restoration of 'socialist legality' (meaning, among other things, ending the use of torture in police interrogations) but also of the release and rehabilitation process, telling delegates at the 1956 party conference that the 'unprecedented violation of revolutionary legality' during the years 1936 to 1953 could not simply be forgotten or swept under the carpet. 9 In 1961 he ordered the removal of Stalin's body from the Mausoleum on Moscow's Red Square, and in 1962 he personally intervened to make possible the publication of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's novella about the Gulag, One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich. 10 One leading German expert on the Stalin era, Jörg Baberowski, has even described the far-reaching changes brought about by Khrushchev as a 'cultural revolution and civilising achievement which changed the lives of millions'.
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Given that the measures outlined above also had major implications for the communist countries of Eastern Europe, and for western republics of the Soviet Union which had witnessed large scale deportations to the east during the Stalin era, it is astonishing how little attention has been paid to the rehabilitation issue in previous literature. 12 On the one hand, these countries and republics now had to reintegrate some of the prisoners released from the Gulag -those, not few in number, who had a claim to be repatriated or resettled in their original homelands after years of living in captivity or forced exile. As Matthew Stibbe demonstrates in his chapter, this posed a particular challenge to the GDR and its claim to represent the 'better Germany' in the 1950s. On the other hand, the East European states had 5 also instigated their own terror systems during the years 1948-53. In some of the Soviet bloc countries this involved the staging of high-profile show trials against alleged 'Titoists' or 'Zionists', and in all of them, the imprisonment of large numbers of real and presumed ideological opponents and 'class enemies'. The Czechoslovaks, Romanians and East
Germans even continued to hold frame-up political trials, albeit in camera rather than as public events, in 1954 and 1955. 13 Thereafter pressure grew to follow the Kremlin's lead and end the practice of extra-judicial purges, mass incarceration and overt political repression.
Equally, Soviet bloc countries were urged to establish sentencing review bodies and rehabilitation commissions of their own, with some satellite nations -notably Hungary and, to a lesser extent, Poland -proving more willing than others, and one country in particular, Czechoslovakia, experiencing a delayed, but far-reaching, form of de-Stalinisation in the 1960s which failed with the crushing of the Prague Spring in 1968. Ironically but tellingly, the only Warsaw Pact state that refused to participate in the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia -Romania -was also the one that had gone least far in terms of restoring justice to domestic victims of terror. Instead, as Calin Goina shows in his chapter, although three separate amnesties took place in the early 1960s, the country's formal break with Stalinism was more or less restricted to the years 1968-69, when selected individuals were publicly rehabilitated to serve the new nationalist direction taken by the maverick dictator Nicolae Ceauşescu.
In the 1970s the number of political prisoners rose again across the Soviet bloc, in spite of the signing of the Helsinki agreements in 1975. Although they were no longer allowed to use physical force or torture, the communist security services could still harass people, spy on them, blackmail them, collect evidence for use against them in criminal state prosecutions, and even have them confined to psychiatric institutions. 14 In reality a full reckoning with
Stalin's legacy was not possible until communist rule came to an end in the late 1980s and 6 early 1990s. Yet even now the process of rehabilitation is still ongoing, both in Eastern Europe and in the successor states of the Soviet Union.
Rehabilitation, Restitution and Transitional Justice in Global Context
The collapse of a variety of left-and right-wing dictatorships across the world at the end of can finally achieve legal recognition as victims of National Socialist crimes. 20 Equally, deportations. 25 Official recognition, rehabilitation and restitution are thus far from a given for Stalinist terror victims even today. However, perhaps more importantly for our purposes, the appearance of new categories of victim and victimhood in official discourses also demonstrates that, over and above any particular national specificities, rehabilitation -and with it restitution or the righting of historical wrongs -can be a volatile, highly contested and seemingly never-ending process which takes on different meanings in different historical and social contexts.
The experience of Eastern Europe since 1953 fits in with this general observation.
Admittedly here there were no foreign victims of the 'mini-Stalinist' regimes of the late 1940s and early 1950s to atone for, just domestic victims, while today -with the exception of Belarus -membership or aspiring membership of the EU militates against authoritarian or closed legal and political practices. Yet, as several of the essays in this volume indicate, this region too is no stranger to the highly contested and seemingly never-ending nature of the rehabilitation process. Furthermore, the shifting and at times contradictory needs of surviving terror victims and of the families of the deceased, whether for acknowledgement of their suffering and the restoration of their good names, or for privacy and silence, has often come into conflict with the competing claims of (transitioning) nation-states, the legal profession, political parties, the 'reformed' security services, the media and other (self-appointed) guardians of official 'memory' or 'societal interest'. 26 In this respect, the history of rehabilitation in Eastern Europe overlaps considerably with that of rehabilitation in the Soviet
Union since 1953 and the Russian Federation since 1992.
Timelines and Chronology
Turning now from the global and comparative to the regional and historically specific, one key overarching issue that needs to be addressed from the outset is that of chronology or how 'enemies of socialism' to overthrow the communist system and restore capitalism. However, some had been persecuted for who they were (kulaks, members of 'bourgeois' national groups and other 'class enemies') rather than for what they had supposedly done.
Disentangling 'economic' from 'political' offences was also a very tricky task, especially when it came to issues like currency speculation, industrial sabotage or opposition to the collectivisation of farms, which were often punished more harshly to meet the demands of 'class justice'.
More controversially for the rehabilitation process, some released prisoners had been While defining victims is hard enough, the term 'rehabilitation' itself creates even greater difficulties. In the communist era it was rarely used by Soviet or Eastern European authorities as it implied an admission that the state was guilty of perpetrating past injustices, including repression of elites and whole social groups. In private individuals may have been rehabilitated, but in public the talk was usually of 'amnesties' and 'pardons', thus drawing attention to the supposed beneficence of the communist system. Yet it is intriguing that even in western and post-communist eastern historiography on this theme it is comparatively rare to come across specific definitions of the varying forms of rehabilitation. 38 To redress the balance we have identified four types of rehabilitation: judicial; political; socio-economic;
and moral. We also include the related notion of amnesties or pardons.
Judicial Rehabilitation
Judicial rehabilitation signified that the 'crime' and sentence were legally annulled by the courts, the now 'innocent' ex-prisoner was effectively exonerated, and implicitly at least, it was recognised by the communist authorities that gross miscarriages of justice had taken place. This, in turn, opened up the possibility of financial restitution and other forms of compensation for the suffering endured, itself a potential economic burden for the state. This process went furthest in Czechoslovakia in 1968, when a law was enacted, temporarily as it turned out, granting full judicial and social rehabilitation to those wrongfully convicted, including large numbers of non-communists. However, no other communist state, including the USSR at the time of Khrushchev's 'Thaw', went so far in this direction. Instead, cases
were reviewed on an individual basis. While this inevitably made judicial rehabilitation a very slow process, it also enabled victims to take part in and shape the rehabilitation debate, as they were obliged to petition the authorities for a review of their own cases (see, for example, Elie's chapter on Soviet policy). In Poland too the rehabilitation process was partly driven by determined individuals who demanded to have their cases (or those of deceased family members) reopened, as Piotr Kładoczny shows in his contribution. For those who were unwilling to accept a mere amnesty, he contends, the legal route remained the only path to full exoneration, and an inherently perilous one in the sense that it offered no certainty of success or closure. The same was the case in Belarus, where -according to some of the examples cited by Ramanava in her chapter -judicial reviews could end up confirming the guilt of the accused, even if the original charges were 're-determined' and the sentence correspondingly reduced.
Political Rehabilitation
Political rehabilitation took place when the party authorities accepted that the ideological charges against the victim were false and reinstated former prisoners into the ranks of party, occasionally even allowing a return to responsible positions in the apparatus. This was highly problematic to say the least for incumbent party leaders, because on a personal level so many Rajk, for her own and her husband's political rehabilitation. Ideologically, political rehabilitation was also extremely dangerous in that it could easily cast the entire communist project into doubt and raise very awkward questions: how was it possible that party functionaries condoned such gross illegalities and violations of justice, permitted the mental and physical torture of suspects, encouraged contempt for the rule of law and independent judiciaries, and trampled on human dignity in the name of a higher goal? In these circumstances, it is no wonder that communist leaders routinely dragged their heels on rehabilitation. Nonetheless, a surprising number of former victims sought -or were urged to reapply for -party membership, either from ideological conviction and a belief that Khrushchev had restored 'Leninist norms', or because this was the best way of securing economic or career advancement. Others followed the example of Júlia Rajk in seeking posthumous restoration of membership for deceased relatives. As one pro-communist Soviet woman wrote in an application for the reinstatement of her dead mother's party card:
'Judicial rehabilitation…. without Party rehabilitation is still not rehabilitation'. Gulag. Yet even if this kind of restitution was not on offer (and it rarely was, at least before 1989), a full reintegration of released prisoners into society at least implied a right to employment commensurate with their skills and education, a right to decent housing, social welfare and pensions, and an expectation that their children would not be discriminated against in terms of education and jobs. As we know, reality was often very different, although
Stephen Cohen argues that, once the official formalities were completed, the majority of rehabilitees 'eventually received…. living space, a job or a pension, health and dental care….and other modest benefits of the expanding Soviet welfare system'. 42 This probably only applied to urban dwellers, however, and even here, as Oleg Bazhan points out in his chapter on Soviet Ukraine, the Council of Ministers had to intervene to oblige employers, factory managers and directors of construction sites to hire former prisoners. The fear, which was not without foundation, was that those who remained out of work for a long time would turn to crime or other forms of anti-social behaviour.
Farmers often fared much worse, especially if they came back to areas which had Latvian woman interned with them -they knew both that 'leaving confinement was not a happy prospect if one did not have relatives or close friends waiting outside' and -worse still -that 'being expected and well-received was not as important as having a place to stay'. Ukraine, according to Bazhan, public proposals were heard calling on the authorities to put 21 amnestied prisoners to work on probationary contracts on building sites. In Poland, on the other hand, as Kładoczny indicates, the far-reaching amnesty of April 1956 was deliberately used as a (partially successful) means of discouraging individual bids for rehabilitation, the regime calculating that most of the beneficiaries would simply be glad to be released from prison and would not risk their newly-gained freedom by making trouble for the authorities.
In general, amnesties confirmed the power and authority of the state and were therefore much preferred to rehabilitation. 46 Sometimes they were granted to mark special occasions, Those who received a summons to appear at a meeting of a rehabilitation commission, usually held within the offices of the MVD or the Justice Ministry, would often turn up in layers of clothes, gripping food parcels, accompanied by weeping relatives, certain they were about to be sent away again. 49 The implications of this essential ambivalence at the heart of the rehabilitation process, and more broadly the tortuous 'de-Stalinisation' campaigns of the mid-to-late 1950s and early 1960s, is an important theme in all of the contributions to this volume. Indeed, in spite of the momentous political changes in the Soviet Union between 1953 and 1964, reintegrating prisoners and dealing with the past was an extremely difficult process which involved as much deliberate forgetting on all sides as it did carefully controlled acts of remembering, truth-seeking and absolution. As we have seen, only a handful of perpetrators were ever brought to justice, while the Khrushchev regime continued to mobilise the myth of the Great 
